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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [REDACTED] m 1301, "I" Bldg.

DATE: 2 Sep 52

FROM : [REDACTED] BU/FDD

SUBJECT: USSR Area Program given in [REDACTED] 7 Jul 52 - 29 Aug 52

1. This type of program contributed to analyst effectiveness in the [REDACTED] of FDD by providing the entire branch with a common fund of factual knowledge concerning the Soviet regime from 1917 to 1945. If such was the purpose of the program, the effort was a success.

2. However, the program as presented had several shortcomings, and I should like to make the following criticisms:

- a. The program was too long. Six weeks would have been sufficient.
- b. [REDACTED] did a masterful job for four periods; after that he shifted from theory to an account of the path of events already competently traced for us by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] should have devoted at least one full period to an account of the mechanics of the Soviet regime; i.e., the party and government hierarchies and their interrelation.
- c. [REDACTED] spent half the time allotted him talking on the US economy. His point was that the US and USSR economies faced similar problems and often use similar approaches to their solution. He drew much too heavily on analogy, and should have spent more time on the USSR. For example, he should have spent at least one full period on the mechanics of Soviet economic administration.

3. Adoption of the above suggestions would have related the program more closely to our work problems. The lecture method of presentation was most practical with a class of over 30 people. It would not be feasible to assign reading or papers unless the program were conducted on a full time basis.

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